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I. INTRODUCTION 
Eighty years after the U.S. Supreme Court said that zoning 
 
       †  J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2008.  
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does not violate property owners’ constitutional due process rights,1 
municipal land-use planning is still a thicket that can trap the 
unwitting property owner, city council member, or judge.  On one 
side of that thicket, planning devices are a legitimate exercise of 
government police power because they serve the public welfare.2  
On the other side, planners and officials sometimes “go too far”3 
and impermissibly interfere with private property rights.  A recent 
Minnesota Supreme Court case required justices to wade in and 
decide on which side of the hedge a comprehensive plan falls.4 
The case, Mendota Golf LLP v. City of Mendota Heights,5 involved 
the owners of a private golf course itching to sell to a developer, 
who would replace the links with a low-density housing 
development.  The City of Mendota Heights refused to change its 
comprehensive plan to allow the development.6  There was a twist: 
the comprehensive plan did not allow housing on the site, but the 
city’s zoning ordinance did.7  The immediate issue that confronted 
the Minnesota Supreme Court was whether the city was obligated 
to change the comprehensive plan so that it matched the zoning 
ordinance—and thus allow the housing development.8  The court 
decided that the city could not be forced to change the 
comprehensive plan.9 
While the golf course was tiny, the stakes were huge—the 
entire Twin Cities regional planning scheme was at issue, some 
claimed.10  Yet for a case with such weighty implications, its path to 
 
 1. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that 
the zoning ordinance was a reasonable extension of the village's police power and 
did not have the character of arbitrary fiat, and thus was not unconstitutional). 
 2. See AM. PLANNING ASS’N, POLICY GUIDE ON TAKINGS 3–4 (1995), http:// 
www.planning.org/policyguides/pdf/Takings.pdf. 
 3. David L. Callies, Takings: An Introduction and Overview, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 
441, 443 (2002). 
 4. See Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162 
(Minn. 2006). 
 5. 708 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006). 
 6. Id. at 170. 
 7. Id. at 167–68. 
 8. Id. at 166. 
 9. Id. 
 10. David Peterson, Land-Use Ruling May Have Wider Effect Across Metro, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 23, 2006, at 3B (quoting city attorney calling the ruling a 
“major opinion reinforcing the legitimacy of a community's desire to preserve 
open and recreational spaces as part of an overall land-use plan”); Community 
Rights Report, CRC’S MONTHLY NEWSLETTER (Community Rts. Couns., Wash. D.C.), 
Jan. 2006, at 1, http://www.communityrights.org/PDFs/Newsletters/Jan2006.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2007) (hailing decision as “clear reaffirmation of 
2
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the courthouse was surprisingly marred by mistakes and confusion.  
Nearly every entity in the case stumbled.  The city failed to 
reconcile its comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance despite a 
state mandate,11 left puzzling language in its comprehensive plan,12 
and passed a vaguely worded resolution in turning away the 
developers.13  The landowner overpaid for its property, operated a 
money-losing business there for eight years, and nodded off while 
its ox was gored by the legislature and the city.14  The legislature, 
meanwhile, kept things interesting by flip-flopping—twice—the 
legal hierarchy of planning and zoning.15 
This note first traces the development of land-use law in the 
United States generally and Minnesota specifically, with an 
emphasis on smart-growth controls that—especially since 1995—
enhanced the status of the comprehensive plan.16  Then the note 
examines the supreme court’s decision in Mendota Golf,17 followed 
by an analysis of the ruling.18  The note observes that the supreme 
court opted to protect the comprehensive plan because of its 
importance in the Twin Cities’ regional land-use planning system, 
while leaving the door open for the landowners to return with a 
federal or state constitutional takings claim.19  The note concludes 
that if the landowners do mount a takings challenge, they likely 
would not succeed.20  Because comprehensive planning is a 
legitimate use of the state’s police powers, because it plays a key 
role in the Twin Cities’ regional planning structure, and because 
Mendota Heights went about its planning in a rational way, the 
city’s actions did not “go too far.”21 
 
comprehensive planning for the promotion of the health, safety, and quality of life 
of our communities”). 
 11. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 170–71. 
 12. Id. at 171. 
 13. See id. at 180. 
 14. Brief of Appellant City of Mendota Heights at 8–9, Mendota Golf, 708 
N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006) (No. A04-0206), 2005 WL 3816935. 
 15. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d 166–67; see infra Part II.C. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “private property [shall not] be 
taken for public use without just compensation”); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13 
("[p]rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use 
without just compensation"). 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (setting out Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s now-famous exposition that “while property may be regulated 
3
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II. HISTORY 
Like Jacob and Esau in the Bible,22 planning and zoning have 
had a long and complicated sibling rivalry.  In both cases, the birth 
order was controversial; in both cases, troubles were not far behind. 
A. Planning and Zoning: Early Missteps 
The roots of the conflict trace to the dawn of zoning in the late 
19th century.23  The factories of the industrial revolution belched 
out air and noise pollution, and cities grew congested with 
workers.24  But neighbors trying to protect their interests against 
these modern plagues had only the inadequate tools of common-
law nuisance and servitude doctrines.25  Reform-minded thinkers—
who would become the first city planners—stepped forward in 
England and America with proposals they argued would prevent 
the harmful effects wrought by industrial society.26  Their answer 
was zoning. 
American social reformers, adapting their ideas from the 
earlier proposal of an English author,27 seized on four underlying 
principles that would animate modern city planning: separation of 
uses, protection of the single-family home, low-rise development, 
and medium-density of population.28  Proponents believed these 
principles would protect the public health, safety, welfare, and 
morals.29  “[Z]oning means better homes and an increase of health, 
comfort and happiness for all the people,” said planner Robert H. 
 
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking”). 
 22. Genesis 25:24–26.  Esau came out of Rebecca’s womb first, followed by 
Jacob, holding onto his brother’s heel.  Id. at 25:26. 
 23. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 951–52 (5th ed. 2002). 
 24. Id.; JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE 
PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW 16–22 (1998). 
 25. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 951. 
 26. Id. at 952–955. 
 27. Ebenezer Howard, appalled by the sprawling chaos of London, proposed 
a new type of town known as a Garden City, which would be built in the 
countryside to give people ample space for healthy lives, and would separate the 
“wholesome” suburban-style homes from commerce, industry, and homes that 
would shelter “waifs,” “inebriates,” and the insane.  DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra 
note 23, at 952, referencing Ebenezer Howard, TOMORROW: A PEACEFUL PATH TO 
REAL REFORM (1898) (reprinted as Ebenezer Howard, GARDEN CITIES OF 
TOMORROW (1902)). 
 28. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 953. 
 29. Id. at 971. 
4
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Whitten.30 
The first municipal comprehensive zoning plan was enacted in 
1916.31  The United States Supreme Court upheld zoning’s 
constitutionality in 1926, ruling that government could use its 
police power to keep differing uses apart.32  Hundreds of other 
cities and towns quickly embraced zoning.33  Zoning arrived in the 
Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul in 1922.34 
But there was a problem.  Logically, city planning should have 
been invented first, and then zoning.35  After all, first you plan, and 
then you act.  At least in theory, the comprehensive plan is the 
vision of what a town wants to look like—a “statement of the local 
government’s objectives and standards for development.”36  The 
zoning ordinance then gives effect to the comprehensive plan’s 
vision.37 
Scholars have described zoning’s early dominance over 
planning as a historical error.38  Zoning and planning developed on 
separate tracks, spawned by two different model acts proposed by 
 
 30. William M. Randle, Professors, Reformers, Bureaucrats and Cronies: The Players 
in Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 31, 39 (Charles M. Haar 
& Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989) (quoting Robert H. Whitten, Zoning and Living 
Conditions, 13 PROC. NAT’L CONF. CITY PLAN. 22–23 (1921)). 
 31. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 22. 
 32. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 33. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 23. 
 34. Larry Millett, The Deep Roots of Urban Sprawl, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS 
(Minn.), Nov. 19, 1996, at 1A (arguing that by eliminating mixed-use 
neighborhoods, zoning forced automobile use and made sprawl inevitable). 
 35. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 3.01 (5th ed. 2003). 
 36. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 972 (discussing the Standard State 
Enabling Act, an advisory document issued in 1922 that continues to influence 
states).  Minnesota land use law defines the comprehensive plan as: 
a compilation of policy statements, goals, standards, and maps for 
guiding the physical, social and economic development, both private and 
public, of the municipality and its environs, and may include, but is not 
limited to, the following: statements of policies, goals, standards, a land 
use plan, including proposed densities for development, a community 
facilities plan, a transportation plan, and recommendations for plan 
execution.  A comprehensive plan represents the planning agency's 
recommendations for the future development of the community. 
MINN. STAT. § 462.352, subdiv. 5 (2004). 
 37. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 972 (citing Charles M. Haar, In 
Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1155 (1955)).  See also 
101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 4 (2005). 
 38. Edward J. Sullivan & Matthew J. Michel, Ramapo Plus Thirty: The Changing 
Role of the Plan in Land Use Regulation, 35 URB. LAW. 75, 83 (2003). 
5
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the United States Department of Commerce.39  First, in 1926, came 
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), setting out 
statutory authority for zoning.40  Two years later, the Standard City 
Planning Enabling Act was released, containing statutory authority 
for planning and subdivision control.41  The uneasy relationship 
between planning and zoning that continues to this day has its 
roots in the model acts.  Not only was their timing arguably out of 
sequence, but the documents had internal problems as well.  For 
example, the language of the two acts, and their timing, left 
unclear whether zoning had to be consistent with, or dependent 
on, a comprehensive plan.42  The zoning model act stated, 
enigmatically,43 that zoning “shall be in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan.”44  A footnote in the SZEA declared, “No 
zoning should be done without such a comprehensive study.”45  But 
the planning enabling act made local planning optional.46  
Moreover, it appears the authors of the zoning act did not envision 
enactment of a comprehensive plan in the form of an independent 
document.47  In their first decades, then, zoning ordinances were 
traditionally enacted without any reference to a prior or underlying 
comprehensive municipal plan.48  Land-use law scholars maintain 
that these early missteps laid the groundwork for an approach 
based on short-term thinking.49 
 
 39. Daniel R. Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use 
Regulations, 74 MICH. L. REV. 899, 901 (1976). 
 40. Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce rev. ed. 
1926); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 959; MANDELKER, supra note 35, at § 
3.13. 
 41. Standard City Planning Enabling Act (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 1928); 
MANDELKER, supra note 35, at § 3.05: Edward J. Sullivan, Comprehensive Planning and 
Smart Growth, in TRENDS IN LAND USE LAW FROM A TO Z 177, 189 n.7 (Patricia E. 
Salkin ed., 2001). 
 42. Mandelker, supra note 39, at 901–02. 
 43. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN HOUSING, LAND USE AND 
PLANNING LAW 328 (Richard P. Fishman ed., 1978) [hereinafter HOUSING FOR 
ALL]. 
 44. Mandelker, supra note 39, at 902; Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 3 
(U.S. Dep’t of Commerce rev. ed. 1926). 
 45. Sullivan & Michel, supra note 38, at 75. 
 46. Standard City Planning Enabling Act § 2 (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 1928); 
Mandelker, Role, supra note 39, at 902; MANDELKER, supra note 35, at § 3.5. 
 47. MANDELKER, supra note 35, at § 3.13. 
 48. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 26. 
 49. See Sullivan & Michel, supra note 38, at 81.  “[T]he history of planning and 
land use regulation put zoning ahead of planning.  With no driving vision for land 
use, land use regulation was incoherent and unprincipled in its development, 
6
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Even once the comprehensive plan came into vogue, aided by 
redevelopment needs after World War II,50 it was still primarily 
considered only an advisory document.51  Courts and legislatures 
often failed to see the necessary interrelationship between zoning 
and planning.52  States have varied as to how much legal weight 
should be given to plans and whether a plan is even required.53 
B. Comprehensive Planning and Sprawl 
Gradually, the comprehensive plan gained more than advisory 
status, especially after a landmark article by Charles M. Haar.54  A 
distinguished land-use scholar, Professor Haar argued that a city 
should be required to have a master plan before it could exercise 
its regulatory powers through a zoning ordinance.55 
More recently, states have increasingly been making the 
comprehensive plan a legally binding document.56  Comprehensive 
planning has become a lifeline for reformers anxious to control 
suburban sprawl.57  The movement, which came to be known as 
“smart growth,”58 is shorthand for a “comprehensive planning 
process that preserves open space and encourages the 
concentration of development.”59  To accomplish those goals, 
“[e]ach comprehensive plan must be consistent with an overall, 
connected system or state and regional land use policies,” a veteran 
 
leaving communities without the power to direct their own urbanization activities.”  
Id. 
 50. HOUSING FOR ALL, supra note 43, at 331. 
 51. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 26. 
 52. MANDELKER, supra note 35, at § 3.1; Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a 
Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1154 (1955). 
 53. Edward J. Sullivan, Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning Law, 37 
URB. LAW. 595, 595 (2005). 
 54. Haar, supra note 52, at 1155.  See also HOUSING FOR ALL, supra note 43, at 
332 (reporting a “demonstrable shift” toward Haar’s view by 1978). 
 55. Haar, supra note 52, at 1156. 
 56. Id.  See also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 972 (observing that only 
about half the states require comprehensive plans, “judicial attitudes [toward 
them] vary greatly,” and the trend toward enforcing them “seems not to be 
substantial”).  The Montana Supreme Court endorsed a flexible but definite 
standard in Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Jefferson County, 283 Mont. 486, 495 (1997):  
“[T]o require no compliance at all would defeat the whole idea of planning.  Why 
have a plan if the local government units are free to ignore it at any time?” 
 57. See Mandelker, supra note 39, at 911. 
 58. Sullivan, supra note 41, at 178. 
 59. James A. Kushner, Smart Growth: Urban Growth Management and Land-Use 
Regulation Law in America, 32 URB. LAW. 211, 229 (2000). 
7
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scholar of planning maintains.60  “Comprehensive planning is a 
comprehensive response to the systemic problems of sprawl.”61 
Comprehensive plans have played a central role in Minnesota’s 
response to sprawl.62  The Twin Cities has long been one of 
America’s least-dense metropolitan areas.63  Concerns about sprawl 
began during the 1950s amid waves of migration from Minnesota 
cities to the suburbs.64  The growth overwhelmed sewage treatment 
systems, leading to widespread polluted wells and a public health 
crisis.65  Into the 1960s, the Twin Cities region was suffering the 
growth pains familiar across the country—leapfrogging, scattered 
development, urban sprawl, and deteriorating central cities.66  
Sprawl not only threatened loss of open space but also meant more 
costly public and private facilities and ultimately “vastly” higher 
taxes.67  Eventually it would mean “wellwater problems in Olmsted 
County, farmland [loss] in Winona, failing septic systems in Stearns 
County, rising poverty in Minneapolis and St. Paul, [and] 
exclusionary zoning in developing suburbs.”68  Sprawl posed the 
“[number one] threat to community livability in America today,” an 
author observed in 1996.69 
In 1967, the Minnesota Legislature created the Metropolitan 
Council to oversee “a comprehensive development guide” for the 
Minneapolis-St. Paul region.70  The agency’s creation reflected a 
desire to guard vital open space, and indeed, the region’s quality of 
 
 60. Sullivan, supra note 41, at 179. 
 61. Id. 
 62.   Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 532 
(2005). 
 63. Millett, supra note 34.  See also Dan Wascoe Jr., Road to Sprawl Was Paved 
with Good Intentions, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 22, 2000, at 1A. 
 64. Lynda McDonnell, The Invisible Crisis, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), 
Nov. 18, 1996, at 1A. 
 65. Id. 
 66. ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH 109 (American Bar 
Association 1999).  Freilich was the lead consultant for preparing the Metropolitan 
Council’s development framework in 1973.  Id. at 108–09. 
 67. Id. at 109. 
 68. Lynda McDonnell, Can We Live with the Limits?, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS 
(Minn.), Nov. 23, 1996, at 1A. 
 69. Bill Salisbury, In Fight Against Urban Sprawl, Maryland Tries ‘Smart Growth,’ 
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Feb. 24, 1999, at 1A (quoting Richard Moe, 
former chief of staff to Vice President Walter Mondale and later president of the 
National Trust for Historic Preservation). 
 70. James Poradek, Putting the Use Back in Metropolitan Land-Use Planning: 
Private Enforcement of Urban Sprawl Control Laws, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1355–56 
(1997). 
8
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life, against urban sprawl.71  Gov. Harold LeVander, making the 
first appointments to the council, said the council was needed to 
attack “more and more problems that will pay no heed to the 
boundary lines which mark the end of one community in this 
metropolitan area and the beginning of another.”72  The council 
was widely heralded as a model solution to sprawl.73 
C. Regional Planning in the Twin Cities 
In 1976, lawmakers empowered the Council to control urban 
sprawl by enacting the Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act 
(MLPA).74  The enactment followed several years of conflict and 
uncertainty,75 but once in place, the MLPA was a strong 
endorsement of regional planning, declaring that local 
governmental units were interdependent and that their 
urbanization put pressure on the others, increasing the spillover 
effects of pollution, congestion, and water shortages.76  Suddenly, 
more than 300 separate but overlapping governmental units over 
an area of 3,000 square miles and seven counties would have their 
 
 71. See City of Lake Elmo v. Metro. Council, 685 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2004); see 
also “History of the Metropolitan Council,” e-mail and attached document from Steven 
Dornfeld, Director of Public Affairs, Metropolitan Council, to Eric Linsk (Sept. 5, 
2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Met Council History]. 
 72. “Metropolitan Council Milestones,” e-mail and attached document from 
Steven Dornfeld, Director of Public Affairs, Metropolitan Council, to Eric Linsk 
(Sept. 5, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Milestones]. 
 73. Land Use: The Rage for Reform, TIME, Oct. 1, 1973, available at http://www. 
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,942725,00.html [hereinafter Rage for 
Reform].  
Regional-planning authorities should be encouraged wherever possible.  
These can treat whole watersheds or air basins and thus cope with 
environmental questions too large for local governments.  They also are 
needed around cities, where growth is often the concern of several 
counties.  One model: the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council in 
Minnesota, which plans development for nine counties and has veto 
power over growth-inducing facilities—including projects like airports 
and sewers. 
Id. 
 74. See MINN. STAT. § 473.851 (2004) (declaring that urbanization and 
development transcended municipal boundaries and required “comprehensive 
local planning with land use controls consistent with planned, orderly and staged 
development”); see also Poradek, supra note 70, at 1357. 
 75. ARTHUR NAFTALIN & JOHN BRANDL, THE TWIN CITIES REGIONAL STRATEGY 10 
(Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities Area 1980). 
 76. See MINN. STAT. § 473.851; City of Lake Elmo, 685 N.W.2d at 5. 
9
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plans coordinated.77  The governing bodies had to adopt 
comprehensive plans consistent with the Metropolitan Council’s 
Regional Development Framework and system plans for 
transportation, aviation, water resources (including wastewater 
collection and treatment), and regional parks and open space.78  
The Council was given authority to ensure that the plans conform 
with regional goals.79  Opinions are mixed as to whether the 
council has been a success or a disappointment.  The council has 
received national acclaim,80 but critics charge that its promise 
remains unfulfilled.81  The council won a major victory in 2004 
when the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the council could 
order Lake Elmo to change its comprehensive plan.82 
The Twin Cities regional structure requires municipalities to 
enact zoning controls to implement the comprehensive plan.83  But 
that goal has been undermined by the uneasy relationship between 
comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances, where it has not 
always been clear whether the comprehensive plan is binding and 
which document prevails in a conflict.  The Minnesota legislature 
has see-sawed back and forth as to whether comprehensive plans or 
zoning ordinances should be preeminent.84  First, lawmakers 
favored comprehensive plans.85  In 1985, they made zoning 
 
 77. FREILICH, supra note 66, at 109–10. 
 78. Milestones, supra note 72. 
 79. See MINN. STAT. § 473.175, subdiv. 1 (2004); City of Lake Elmo, 685 N.W.2d 
at 5; Griffith, supra note 62, at 532; NAFTALIN & BRANDL, supra note 75, at 8–10; Met 
Council History, supra note 71. 
 80. TIME, Rage for Reform, supra note 73; Poradek, supra note 70, at 1345. 
 81. See Poradek, supra note 70, at 1344 (arguing that suburban cities’ 
resistance to provide affordable housing has been “more than embarrassing”); 
NAFTALIN & BRANDL, supra note 75, at 59 (finding a consensus in 1980 that the 
council had become less aggressive, less innovative, and more bureaucratic); 
MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS 102 (1997) (contending that the council, with its 
weak derivative power, “has avoided confrontation”); Mike Kaszuba, A ‘Delicate 
Balance’ for Met Council Members, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 30, 1996, at 1A 
(remarking that the council “has in many eyes grown into an ineffective 
bureaucracy”). 
 82. City of Lake Elmo, 685 N.W.2d at 11–12. 
 83. MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 84. See Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 166–
67 (Minn. 2006); Poradek, supra note 70, at 1356–58. 
 85. Poradek, supra note 70, at 1357.  Requiring local zoning controls to 
conform to comprehensive plans reflected the planning act’s original intent, “that 
local governments use zoning to carry out the policies of their comprehensive 
plans.”  Id. 
10
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ordinances predominant.86  With that change, “the whole 
comprehensive planning process in the Twin Cities became null 
and void,” recalled Ted Mondale, a state senator from 1990 to 1996 
and chairman of the Metropolitan Council from 1999 to 2003.87  In 
August 1995, at Mondale’s behest, the legislature enacted changes 
to the MLPA that had been requested by the Metropolitan Council, 
including a provision restoring the primacy of comprehensive 
plans.88  One senator who spoke against the bill argued that it took 
away local zoning control.89  But the adherents of regional planning 
had regained the upper hand.90  A later attempt by some legislators 
to change the law back again failed.91 
 
 86. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 166; Act of May 6, 1985, ch. 62, sec. 4, subdiv. 
1, 1985 Minn. Laws 162 (stating that “[i]f the comprehensive municipal plan is in 
conflict with the zoning ordinance, the zoning ordinance supersedes the plan” 
(formerly codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1)).  The 
measure apparently was introduced to help a suburban community fend off a 
development proposal.  See Cindy Carlsson, How Bad Ideas Become Law, Minnesota 
Chapter of the American Planning Association (June 1997), available at 
http://www.mnapa.com/previousnews/june97.html. 
 87. Telephone interview with Ted Mondale, CEO, Nazca Solutions, Inc. in St. 
Paul, Minn. (Sept. 20, 2006). 
 88. See Act of May 17, 1995, ch. 176, sec. 5, 1995 Minn. Laws 593, 594–95 
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2005), striking out 
language saying the zoning ordinance “supersedes” the comprehensive plan); 
BRIEFLY: THE MINNESOTA SENATE WEEK IN REVIEW (May 12, 1995), available at 
http://www.senate.mn/briefly/1995/bri512.txt [hereinafter SENATE BRIEFLY] 
(reporting legislative debate comments by Sen. Ted Mondale about his proposed 
amendment to § 473.858); Brief of Appellant at 29–30, Mendota Golf, LLP v. City 
of Mendota Heights 708 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006) (No. A04-206) (quoting Sen. 
Mondale saying in floor debate that “the comprehensive plan has to be more 
important than the zoning documents”). 
 89. SENATE BRIEFLY, supra note 88 (reporting comments of Sen. Roy 
Terwilliger, R–Edina). 
 90. The planning statute now reads: 
If the comprehensive municipal plan is in conflict with the zoning 
ordinance, the zoning ordinance shall be brought into conformance with 
the plan by local government units in conjunction with the review and, if 
necessary, amendment of its comprehensive plan. . . . After August 1, 
1995, a local government unit shall not adopt any fiscal device or official 
control which is in conflict with its comprehensive plan . . . . 
MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 91. Carlsson, supra note 86.  Rep. Tim Pawlenty, later to become Minnesota’s 
governor, was a co-sponsor of the bill.  Journal of the House of Representatives, 
80th Leg., Reg. Sess., 3974 (Minn. May 12, 1997).  The bill died in committee.  
H.F. 2205 Status in House for Legislative Session 80, at http://ros.leg.mn/re 
visor/pages/search_status/status_detail.php?b=House&f=HF2205&ssn=0&y=1997 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2007). 
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III.  THE MENDOTA GOLF DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
The 17.5-acre property at Dodd Road and Bachelor Avenue in 
suburban Mendota Heights has been a nine-hole, par-three golf 
course since the early 1960s.92  One city council member called the 
tract “a treasure to the neighborhood.”93  Neighbors considered the 
course and other green spaces part of what made Mendota Heights 
different from other suburbs.94  Homeowners on the course’s 
southern side enjoyed a scenic view of the Mississippi River.95  “Par 
3,” as people called it, was also the only remaining public golf 
course in Mendota Heights.96 
Mendota Golf, LLP, purchased the property in January 1995.97  
At the time of its acquisition, the land was zoned Residential (R-1 
One-Family Residential), while the city’s comprehensive plan 
labeled the property as “Golf Course” (GC).98  Mendota Golf paid 
$1.289 million for the property,99 which was an “inflated price” for a 
golf course.100  Because of the zoning designation, the owners 
believed they had a “safety net” to develop the property someday if 
the golf course became unprofitable.101  That day came in 2003, 
when the landowners sold to a developer that proposed to do away 
with the golf course and build homes on the property.102  But the 
 
 92. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 166. 
 93. Mendota Heights City Council Minutes 9 (July 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.mendota-heights.com/pdf/03july1.pdf [hereinafter July 2003 Minutes] 
(reporting the remarks of Councilmember Mary Jeanne Schneeman). 
 94. Id. at 15 (reporting the statement of Dr. Jim Smith, a neighbor of the 
property). 
 95. Peterson, supra note 10, at 3B (quoting lawyer for Mendota Heights).  
Others, including attorney Clifford M. Greene, argued that “[p]eople who have 
bought land based on those views are entitled to some rights as well.”  Id. 
 96. Mendota Heights Parks and Recreation Committee Minutes 2 (Oct. 12, 
2004) (reporting comments of Commissioner Morris)[hereinafter Parks and Rec 
Minutes]. 
 97. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 166. 
 98. Id. 
 99. July 2003 Minutes, supra note 93, at 9 (reporting the statement of Mendota 
Golf partner Alan Spaulding). 
 100. Id. at 12. 
 101. See Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 166.  At the time of the purchase, 
Minnesota law made zoning designations preeminent over comprehensive plan 
designations.  Id.  About five months after the purchase, the legislature restored 
comprehensive plans’ prominence.  Id. 
 102. Id. at 169. 
12
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land sale was contingent on persuading Mendota Heights to 
change the comprehensive plan’s designation of the property from 
golf course to low-density residential.103 
In the years leading up to Mendota Golf’s request, the city had 
gone through an extensive review of its land-use goals.104  Mendota 
Heights officials in 2002 reaffirmed planning goals they had first 
enacted in 1979 in accordance with the Metropolitan Land 
Planning Act.105  Back in 1979, the comprehensive plan put the golf 
course property in the land use category “GC” for golf course, and 
“guided” the adjacent land as low-density residential.106  The GC 
designation was retained in 2002.107  The 1979 plan’s goals—
including preservation of green spaces, open spaces, and 
recreational facilities—were also renewed in 2002.108  The adoption 
of the comprehensive plan in 2002 followed a three-year review 
process in which several public hearings were held.109  Mendota 
Golf did not come before the city at that time to request changes in 
the property’s designation.110  A partner in Mendota Golf later said 
he and his partner were not aware of the hearings.111 
But the city’s policy choice was still tinged with ambiguity.  
While officials maintained the golf course designation in the 
comprehensive plan, they failed to resolve the apparent conflict 
between the plan and the zoning ordinance, keeping the property’s 
residential zoning in place.112  The city’s officials also left open the 
possibility that the golf course might someday be developed.113 
Against this uncertain backdrop, Mendota Golf in 2003 
requested that the city change the comprehensive plan’s 
designation for the property from “Golf Course” to “Low Density 
 
 103. Id.  Specifically, the sale was contingent on "the buyer's obtaining 
necessary governmental approvals for proposed residential development."  Id. 
 104. Id. at 167–68. 
 105. Id. at 167. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 168. 
 111. Id. at 170. 
 112. Id. at 168.  The city’s Technical Plan, though, expressed “concern” about 
the conflict, given the city’s obligations under the MLPA, and legal uncertainty 
over how to move forward.  Id. at 168 n.4. 
 113. Id. at 168.  The city’s Technical Plan stated that if “future redevelopment 
of this site is contemplated, careful consideration would need to be given to 
develop the site in a manner consistent with and sensitive to the existing low-
density residential neighborhood.”  Id. (citation omitted in original). 
13
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Residential.”114  A Mendota Golf partner said the golf course was no 
longer profitable.115  The city’s consulting planner recommended 
that “an alternate land use designation for the site is appropriate,” 
depending on review of the landowner’s claim that a golf course 
was no longer viable.116  But sentiment for its preservation remained 
strong and after a public hearing, the city planning commission 
recommended rejecting the request.117  The city council then 
turned it down by a 5–0 vote after a tense public meeting.118  
Officials and residents began floating the idea that the city 
purchase the property to keep it a golf course.119 
Mendota Golf brought an action for mandamus120 in district 
court asking that the city be ordered to change the comprehensive 
plan as requested.121  The district court granted the order, finding 
the city’s denial had been arbitrary, capricious, and without a 
rational basis.122  The court of appeals affirmed.123  The court of 
appeals emphasized the city’s failure for nearly eight years to carry 
out its statutory duty to reconcile the two plans.124  The court of 
 
 114. Id. at 169. 
 115. Id.  In 2003, Alan Spaulding said Mendota Golf lost money on the golf 
course in every year since it was acquired.  Brian Bonner, Key Ruling Undercuts Golf 
Course Backers, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Dec. 12, 2003, at B2 [hereinafter 
Bonner, Key Ruling].  Spaulding asked the city to “restore the rights” that the 
landowners first had when they purchased the property, back when the zoning 
ordinance prevailed over the comprehensive plan and allowed residential 
development on the parcel.  708 N.W.2d at 169 (citation omitted in original).  But 
see Brian Bonner, Par 3 Opponent Raises His Voice, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), 
Feb. 8, 2007 (discussing newly released financial statements showing “what city 
officials have contended all along: [that] [m]inus debt service for the purchase, 
the course is profitable”). 
 116. 708 N.W.2d at 169 (citation omitted in original). 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. at 169–70.  Mendota Golf partner Alan Spaulding told the council 
that his firm had a contract to sell to a development company for more than 
double the price that a golfing group had offered.  See July 2003 Minutes, supra 
note 93, at 8.  The conditional offer was for $2.35 million.  Bonner, Key Ruling, 
supra note 115.  Council Member Jack Vitelli responded that the Council had no 
obligation to help the landowners double their money over the original purchase 
price.  July 2003 Minutes, supra note 93, at 10. 
 119. Parks and Rec Minutes, supra note 96, at 2–3. 
 120. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 980 (8th ed. 2004) (defining mandamus as “[a] 
writ issued by a superior court to compel a lower court or governmental officer to 
perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly”). 
 121. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 170. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, No. A04-206, 2004 WL 
2161422, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 708 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006). 
 124. Mendota Golf, 2004 WL 2161422, at *2. 
14
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appeals also seized on a “peculiar provision” in Mendota Heights’ 
comprehensive plan “stating that the primary authority for 
development decisions is the zoning ordinance.”125  The court of 
appeals interpreted the statement to mean that in a conflict 
between the comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance, the 
zoning ordinance shall prevail.126 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of 
appeals.127  The court found that the zoning and comprehensive 
plan conflicted,128 and that under state law129 the landowner was 
indeed entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the city to resolve 
the conflict.130  But the supreme court found that the district court 
exceeded its authority by ordering the city to resolve the conflict in 
a specific way.131 
The court found that the Minnesota Land Planning Act132 was 
clear133 about the dominance of comprehensive municipal plans 
and their place in a regional planning scheme.134  Therefore, the 
mandamus order would force the city to violate the statute.135 
The court noted that previous case law considered a legislative 
body’s enactment of zoning regulations an act of legislative 
discretion.136  Courts upheld zoning decisions unless challengers 
could show the classification lacked any relationship to public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare—the “rational basis” 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 182. 
 128. Id. at 173. 
 129. MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 130. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 183. 
 131. Id. at 174 (emphasis added). 
 132. MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 133. “When the words of a statute . . . are clear and free from ambiguity, 
judicial construction is inappropriate.”  Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass’n v. City 
of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Minn. 1984). 
 134. See Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 175. 
 135. Id.  As a threshold issue, the supreme court discussed whether mandamus 
was appropriate to compel Mendota Heights to amend its comprehensive plan.  Id. 
at 171–79.  The court concluded mandamus was not appropriate because it would 
have invaded the city’s exercise of legislative discretion in zoning matters, but the 
court went on to consider the substantive issues anyway.  Id. at 179. 
 136. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 174 (citing Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 
N.W.2d 409, 414 (Minn. 1981)).  See also State, by Rochester Ass’n of 
Neighborhoods v. City of Rochester, 268 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Minn. 1978). 
15
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test.137  In this case, Mendota Heights acted rationally138 based on 
the property’s historical designation, regulation, and character,139 
and in light of the city’s extensive planning process.140 
The dissent, for its part, expressed concern about the 
decision’s impact on private-property rights.141  The ruling 
effectively ordered the landowner to forever keep the property as a 
golf course due to its value to the community as open space.142  
Indeed, the dissent asserted that “there might be regulatory taking 
implications in the actions taken by the City.”143  Mendota Golf had 
not argued a takings claim,144 despite one of its partners earlier 
hinting at it before the city council.145  The majority said the 
landowners, after remand, could return with a regulatory takings 
claim if unable to reach a settlement with the city.146 
IV. ANALYSIS OF MENDOTA GOLF 
Mendota Golf is the latest case to seriously test Minnesota’s 
commitment to the system of regional planning laid out by the 
 
 137. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 179–80 (quoting Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 414–
15). 
 138. Id. at 182.  “[W]e conclude that legitimate objectives supported the city's 
denial of Mendota Golf's application for an amendment to the city's 
comprehensive plan, and Mendota Golf has failed to establish that the city lacked 
a rational basis for the decision.”  Id.  The court of appeals had not even applied 
the rationality test.  Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, No. A04-206, 
2004 WL 2161422, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2004), rev’d, 708 N.W.2d 162.  
The appellate court said the city lacked entitlement to rational basis review 
because it had not put all its stated reasons for rejection into its resolution.  See id. 
 139. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 181 n.13. 
 140. Id. at 181.  Nevertheless, the supreme court decided the “peculiar phrase” 
did not confer primary power on the zoning ordinance, because of additional 
language in the provision, which said that the comprehensive plan provides the 
city’s land-use goals, “while the zoning ordinance provides the legislative means of 
carrying out those goals.”  Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 175 n.8. 
 141. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 162, 184 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id.  The dissent also said it was “not at all clear” that the city had acted 
rationally.  Id. 
 143. Id. (citing McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980) 
(holding that landowners deprived of economic benefit by zoning regulations 
were entitled to compensation under some circumstances)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. July 2003 Minutes, supra note 93, at 8–9. 
 146. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 182.  The city is now moving toward bringing 
its plans into conformance.  E-mail from John Huber, Mayor of Mendota Heights, 
to Eric Linsk (Oct. 2, 2006, 07:59 CDT) (on file with author).  The city has verbally 
told the landowners that Mendota Heights would comply with the court’s 
direction by Dec. 31, 2006.  Id. 
16
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legislature—albeit in fits and starts—over the last thirty years.  The 
Court refrained from making bold pronouncements about that 
planning scheme, instead hewing closely to the legislative authority 
and producing a careful, functional decision. 
A. Legislature Embraces Regionalism, For Now 
Since the inception of the regional planning statute, 
lawmakers in Minnesota have demonstrated ambivalence about 
how much power to invest in the comprehensive plan.147  
Nonetheless, the statute has remained constant now for more than 
a decade, suggesting that the legislature has settled the issue.148 
1. Legislative Intent 
Records of the 1995 debate indicate that legislators intended 
to restore the primacy of comprehensive plans.149  The sponsor of 
the change was open about its purpose.150  But the change was not 
without opponents.  One senator criticized the 1995 measure and 
tried in vain to delete the pertinent provisions.151  A bill proposed 
in 1997 to reverse course again went nowhere.152  Comprehensive 
plans are a key facet of the Met Council’s regional strategy,153 a 
strategy that was reaffirmed in the Lake Elmo decision.154  As a policy 
matter, it is reasonable to read the Metropolitan Land Planning 
Act155 as requiring that zoning conform to comprehensive plans. 
2. Statutory Construction 
The city argued and the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted 
that zoning ordinances must be brought in line with 
 
 147. Compare MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (1994) (providing that a city’s 
zoning designations take priority over conflicting comprehensive plans), with 
MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004) (providing that comprehensive plans take 
priority). 
 148. MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004); Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 166. 
 149. Brief of Appellant City of Mendota Heights at 29–30, Mendota Golf, 708 
N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006) (No. A04-0206) (quoting Sen. Ted Mondale, sponsor of 
the amendment favoring comprehensive plans). 
 150. Brief of Appellant City of Mendota Heights, supra note 149, at 29–30. 
 151. SENATE BRIEFLY, supra note 88 (reporting debate comments of Sen. Roy 
Terwilliger). 
 152. H.R. 2205, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997). 
 153. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 182. 
 154. City of Lake Elmo v. Metro. Council, 685 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2004). 
 155. MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
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comprehensive plans.156  But as the landowners argued, the statute 
does allow for conflicts to be resolved by amendment of the 
comprehensive plan.157  Though this is a reasonable reading, the 
text does not require a city to choose that route,158 and for the court 
to order such an action would undermine the legislature’s choice 
to invest authority in the comprehensive plan.159 
In the end, by upholding Mendota Heights’ refusal to change 
its comprehensive plan, the Minnesota Supreme Court respected 
the legislature’s clear policy choice in 1995 elevating the 
comprehensive plan in order to control and guide growth. 
B. Municipal Planning and Zoning Power 
Mendota Golf posed the question: who gets to decide what a city 
looks like—its citizen-residents or its property owners?160  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court answered that the city had the right to 
stand by its vision, sand traps and all.161 
The case’s outcome arguably caused an injustice to the 
Mendota Golf partners, who purchased land only to see the 
regulatory ground shift under their feet six months later.162  But as 
the court said, “the power to zone has been delegated to the city 
council and not to the courts.”163  The supreme court has 
consistently recognized in the past that municipalities making 
zoning decisions are acting in their legislative capacities under 
their delegated police powers.164  Those decisions are upheld unless 
 
 156. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 175; Brief of Appellant City of Mendota 
Heights, supra note 149, at 35. 
 157. MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004); Brief of Respondent Mendota 
Golf, LLP at 12, Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006) (No. A04-0206). 
 158. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 175. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 175. 
 161. Id. at 183 (stating that the City Council is permitted to exercise its 
discretion in resolving the conflict between the comprehensive plan and the 
zoning ordinance). 
 162. Several events combined to shift the regulatory ground on which 
Mendota Golf partners stood.  The landowners purchased the property in 1995 in 
reliance on the law at that time.  See id. at 169.  The city failed to reconcile its 
comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance for eight years despite state law 
requiring it.  Id. at 182.  The city wrote the “peculiar provision” in the 
comprehensive plan, which appeared to delegate power back to the zoning 
ordinance.  Id. at 175 n.8.  The golf course was entirely surrounded by single-
family residential development.  Id. at 166. 
 163. Id., 708 N.W.2d at 182. 
 164. State, by Rochester Ass’n of Neighborhoods v. City of Rochester, 268 
18
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opponents prove the decisions lack any rational basis related to 
public health, safety, morals, or the general welfare.165  In Mendota 
Heights’ case, the city decided after an extensive planning process, 
that keeping the property a “Par 3” golf course was related to 
public health and the general welfare.166  The city likewise was 
making a rational legislative decision when it considered the 
property owners’ proposed change in the comprehensive plan and 
turned it down.167 
C. The Unresolved Question of Regulatory Taking 
A looming question is whether the landowners were subjected 
to a “regulatory taking.”168  The landowners did not bring a takings 
claim, so the supreme court majority did not analyze the 
question.169  A traditional physical taking occurs when the 
government seizes property through its powers of eminent 
domain.170  A regulatory taking occurs when government regulates 
property so substantially that the property has arguably been 
“taken” by the government.171 
Distinguishing a regulatory taking from a permissible planning 
regulation (which does not require compensation) can be 
difficult.172  The U.S. Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence has 
zigged and zagged over the past eighty years and left hazy and 
shifting guidance.173  In 1922, in the Court’s first major modern 
 
N.W.2d 885, 888 (Minn. 1978). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 167, 169. 
 167. Id. at 169–70. 
 168. U.S. CONST., amend. V; Callies, supra note 3; see also Arthur G. Boylan, 
Note, Property—Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases:  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
Muddled Analysis in Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 695, 706 
(2002) (observing that Minnesota largely follows the U.S. Supreme Court’s takings 
jurisprudence and likewise “lacks clarity”). 
 169. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 182 n.14.  The court did not address 
“whether Mendota Golf might ultimately have a valid takings claim based on the 
proposition that the restrictions on the use of its land to a golf course constitutes a 
regulatory taking.”  Id. 
 170. Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, 
Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 314 (2006). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 257 (Minn. 1980) 
(remarking on the “great deal of confusion over the standards used to determine 
whether there has been a taking of private property as a result of governmental 
regulation of land use”). 
 173. The Supreme Court has twice quoted planning scholar Charles Haar in 
19
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takings case, it found a state effort to regulate subsistence coal 
mining so onerous as to be a taking.174  Four decades later, the 
Court declared that “[t]here is no set formula to determine where 
regulation ends and taking begins.”175  It is essentially a question of 
“reasonableness.”176  In more recent decades, a nascent property 
rights movement has reignited the Court’s search for discernible 
takings standards.177  Mendota Heights’ decision meets the modern 
tests established by the U.S. Supreme Court and followed by 
Minnesota.178 
1. Penn Central 
In 1978, the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City decided the city had not committed a regulatory 
taking when it refused a developer’s plan to build a fifty-story office 
building atop the stately Grand Central Station.179 The decision 
established a new approach to takings.180  Where there is neither a 
physical invasion nor a total loss of economic value, the court said, 
 
regulatory cases, remarking that “the attempt to distinguish ‘regulation’ from 
‘taking’ as the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of 
contemporary land-use law . . . one that may be the lawyer's equivalent of the 
physicist's hunt for the quark.”  See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 200 n.17 (1985) (quoting CHARLES M. HAAR, LAND 
USE PLANNING 766 (3d  ed. 1976)); San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 
U.S. 621, 650 n.15 (1981) (Brennen, J., dissenting) (quoting CHARLES M. HAAR, 
LAND USE PLANNING (3d ed. 1976)). 
 174. In Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the Court held that a 
“diminution in value” from a government regulation would constitute a taking.  Id. 
at 415.  The case is remembered for Justice Holmes’ pronouncement that “while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”  Id. 
 175. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). 
 176. Id. at 594–95. 
 177. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (holding a 
taking should be upheld as consistent with the Public Use Clause, U.S. Const., 
amend. 5, as long as it is “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”); Kelo 
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (holding that city’s exercise of economic 
development plan satisfied constitutional “public use” requirement). 
 178. Boylan, supra note 168, at 706. 
 179. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978). 
 180. Prior to Penn Central, the most influential takings case had been 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), which held that government 
regulation becomes a compensable taking when it causes a diminution in value of 
“a certain magnitude.”  260 U.S. at 413.  Penn Central, to the contrary, held that 
mere diminution in value from land use regulations did not, standing alone, 
constitute a taking.  438 U.S. at 130–31. 
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a balancing test is applied.181  Factors to be balanced include the 
extent of the economic impact on the property owner, the owner’s 
distinct investment-backed expectations, and the law’s benefit to 
the public.182  Based on the application of these factors, the 
comprehensive plan in Mendota Golf would likely survive the Penn 
Central balancing test. 
a. Public Purpose Justified City’s Action 
Penn Central observed that a taking is less likely to be found 
when interference with property arises from a “public program 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good.”183  The Mendota Heights City Council stated a 
public purpose—maintenance of green space and recreational 
options for the residents—in retaining the comprehensive plan’s 
golf course designation.184  The city conducted a democratic 
process with notice and hearings185 and maintained a designation 
that had been on the books since 1979.186  The landowner, 
however, failed to show up during the review of the plan.187 
b. Owner’s Expectations 
Applying the Penn Central framework, a crucial point is 
whether the partners’ investment-backed expectations in 1995—
which amounted to the belief that development could be a “safety 
net” if the golf course did not work out188—were distinct.  
Evaluating the “distinct” question in hindsight is difficult, and the 
case brought out little hard evidence on the point.  An owner’s 
expectations are based on the facts at the time of purchase.189  
 
 181. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 167 
(Minn. 2006). 
 185. Id. at 168. 
 186. Id. at 167. 
 187. See id. at 168. “Despite published notice of the city's plans to revise its 
comprehensive plan, Mendota Golf did not appear before the city to request 
alternate ‘guiding’ of the property.”  Id. 
 188. See July 2003 Minutes, supra note 93, at 12 (stating that the owner claimed 
to have paid an inflated market price—about double—for the golf course with the 
expectation that should the business fail, development of the property was a viable 
alternative). 
 189. See, e.g., Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, No. A05-1074, 2006 WL 
1390278, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 2006), rev. granted (Aug. 15, 2006) (citing 
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Mendota Golf bought the property as a golf course and operated it 
as a golf course for eight years.190  Had the landowner’s plans been 
distinct, the firm would have sought an amendment to the 
comprehensive plan right away to resolve the conflict between the 
plan and the zoning ordinance, rather than waiting eight years.  It 
would have paid attention to—and perhaps intervened to 
prevent—the important change in land-use law enacted by the 
legislature, which flip-flopped the authority of comprehensive plans 
and zoning ordinances.191  It would have come forward when 
Mendota Heights reviewed the comprehensive plan and reenacted 
the golf course designation in 2002.192  Through the lens of 
hindsight, it looks as much like a bad business decision as an 
investment.193 
A recent decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 
influenced by the Mendota Golf ruling,194 employed a similar analysis 
in rejecting a takings claim involving another golf course in the 
Twin Cities.195  In both cases, it was not the cities’ actions that 
caused the golf courses’ economic troubles. 
2. Lucas 
Fourteen years after Penn Central, the Supreme Court tackled 
another regulatory takings case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council.196  David Lucas purchased beachfront lots on a barrier 
island east of Charleston with the intention of building single-
family homes.197  A regulatory change in South Carolina’s coastal-
 
Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 553 (Minn. 1996)).  In Wensmann, 
the court noted that a buyer of a golf course “had no reasonable investment-
backed expectation to develop its land as residential property because [the buyer] 
purchased the land as an established golf course with the intention of continuing 
to operate it as a golf course . . . [t]he applicant for rezoning ‘knew at the time of 
purchase that the property was subject to a zoning restriction.’”  Id. at *3 (citing 
Myron v. City of Plymouth, 562 N.W.2d 21, 23–24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff'd 
without opinion, 581 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1998)). 
 190. See Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 169. 
 191. Id. at 166. 
 192. Id. at 167. 
 193. See July 2003 Minutes, supra note 93, at 8 (stating that after eight years of 
operation, the golf course was not profitable and that the owner just wanted to be 
rid of the property and to recoup some or all of his investment). 
 194. Wensmann Realty, 2006 WL 1390278. 
 195. Id. at *2–4. 
 196. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 197. Id. at 1006–07. 
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zone permit requirements foiled his plans, and he was prohibited 
from building on the lots.198  The Supreme Court was asked to 
decide whether the regulation’s dramatic effect on the economic 
value of the lots amounted to a regulatory taking.199 
The majority opinion in Lucas attempted to establish a more 
objective standard for regulatory takings than Penn Central had.200  
The Lucas Court declared that a total wipeout of a property’s value 
is a per se taking unless the government regulation is addressing a 
traditional common-law nuisance.201 
The Mendota Golf facts are far different from those in Lucas.  In 
Lucas, the property owner was stuck with unimprovable lots.202  
Under the Mendota Heights comprehensive plan, by contrast, the 
developers’ property still had value as a golf course, albeit perhaps 
an unprofitable one.203  One person had expressed interest in 
buying the property, but the price was not high enough for the 
Mendota Golf partners.204 
3. Lingle 
The Supreme Court’s latest word on takings came in Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.205  There are two circumstances that will be held 
as per se takings: physical occupations206 and total economic 
 
 198. Id. at 1007. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Kushner, supra note 59, at 216. 
 201. 505 U.S. at 1019, 1030–32.  Debate has raged ever since over the impact 
of Lucas.  See RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE & SOCIETY 267 (1996).  Professor 
James Kushner has called Lucas a “powerful precedent” that validates virtually all 
mainstream zoning and land development regulation, and most growth 
management strategies as well.  Kushner, supra note 59, at 218.  Kushner argues 
that, despite the rise of the property rights movement, courts are more deferential 
than ever to local planning autonomy, including smart growth strategies.  Id. at 
237. 
 202. 505 U.S. at 1009.  Some observers continue to dispute the underlying 
facts of Lucas.  See Singer, supra note 170, at 317. 
 203. July 2003 Minutes, supra note 93, at 9. 
 204. Id. at 8 (reporting remarks of partner Alan Spaulding that the offered 
price “was no where [sic] near where it had to be”). 
 205. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).  In Lingle, responding to concerns about the effects 
of market concentration on gasoline prices, the State of Hawaii had limited the 
rent that oil companies could charge service station operators.  Id. at 533.  
Chevron persuaded the federal district court that the cap was an uncompensated 
taking because it did not “substantially advance” Hawaii's asserted interest in 
controlling gas prices.  Id. at 533–34. 
 206. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
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wipeout.207  Otherwise, takings claims are judged by the balancing 
factors of Penn Central,208 with the inquiry reduced to whether the 
impact of the regulatory action was “functionally equivalent” to a 
classic taking in which government took property from a private 
owner or ousted the owner.209  In the Mendota Golf case, the city’s 
action was not equivalent to a physical taking or ouster, rather it 
involved the city’s classic use of traditional land-use regulation in 
the public interest.210 
4.  McShane 
The Mendota Golf dissent, in raising the possibility that 
Mendota Heights had engaged in a regulatory taking, observed that 
Minnesota entitles property owners deprived of economic benefit 
by zoning regulations to compensation “under some 
circumstances.”211  But the cited case’s application to the Mendota 
Golf facts is questionable.  McShane v. City of Faribault involved a 
municipal airport zoning regulation that affected nearby private 
property.212  In McShane, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that if 
the land-use regulation is enacted for the benefit of a “government 
enterprise,” the government must compensate the affected 
landowners.213  Mendota Heights, in contrast, was not burdening a 
property owner to benefit a government enterprise.214  Moreover, 
McShane held that if an ordinance has a “legitimate comprehensive 
planning objective, there is no taking unless all reasonable uses of 
 
 207. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. 
 208. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 209. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124).  
See also Daphne Vlcek, Consumers Union Of United States, Inc. v. New York, 22 TOURO 
L. REV. 319, 331 (2006). 
 210. Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 181–82 
(Minn. 2006). 
 211. Id. at 184 (citing McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253 (1980)). 
 212. 292 N.W.2d at 255–56. 
 213. Id. at 258–59.  McShane embraced Professor Joseph Sax’s argument that a 
regulatory taking occurs when government acts as entrepreneur, but not where 
the government acts in its traditional role as arbiter.  See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and 
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).  In McShane, the City of Faribault was acting 
as an entrepreneur by operating an airport.  292 N.W.2d at 258–59. 
 214. But see Mendota Heights City Council Minutes 24 (May 6, 2003), available 
at http://www.mendota-heights.com/pdf/03May06.pdf (reporting statement of 
developer’s representative Jim Johnston that property owners should not be asked 
to provide the public with open space in perpetuity). 
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the property have been proscribed.”215  The Mendota Heights 
comprehensive plan had the legitimate objective of keeping the 
parcel a golf course, and continued use as a golf course was 
reasonable. 216  Lastly, McShane required compensation to 
landowners whose property has suffered a “substantial and 
measurable decline in market value as a result of the 
regulations.”217  Mendota Golf’s property, under the comprehensive 
plan designation in place since 1979, maintains the same value it 
has had all along—the value of a golf course. 
D. Impact: Regional Planning v. Property Rights 
The majority in Mendota Golf said its decision was narrow.218  
But some outside observers predicted a broad impact.219  In fact, 
the ruling’s influence was demonstrated almost immediately, as 
officials in neighboring Eagan were encouraged by the Mendota Golf 
ruling to resist development plans on the Carriage Hills golf 
course.220  The gamble succeeded, as the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals reversed a district court’s order that Eagan amend its 
comprehensive plan to allow the development.221  The court of 
appeals relied squarely on Mendota Golf.222  “The ‘legitimate 
interests’ recognized in Mendota Golf are nearly identical to the 
reasons stated here,” the court of appeals said.223  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court granted review and expects to hear the case in 
2007.224 
Chances are that Mendota Golf will have the same effect on 
other local governments, providing them with newfound 
 
 215. 292 N.W.2d at 257 n.2 (citing Holaway v. City of Pipestone, 269 N.W.2d 28 
(Minn. 1978)). 
 216. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 217. Id. at 258–59. 
 218. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 182.  The court said it did not intend to force 
a permanent comprehensive plan designation on the golf course property.  
Rather, Mendota Golf and the city were free to discuss and negotiate the use of 
the property.  Id. 
 219. Peterson, supra note 10, at 3B. 
 220. Meggen Lindsay, City Will Fight Subdivision Plan: Council Drops Settlement 
With Golf Course, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Jan. 18, 2006, at B1. 
 221. Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, No. A05-1074, 2006 WL 1390278, 
at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 2006), rev. granted (Aug. 15, 2006). 
 222. Id. at *2. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Meggen Lindsay, Carriage Hills Battle Is on Again: State Supreme Court Will 
Review Lawsuit, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Aug. 23, 2006, at B1. 
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confidence that their planning decisions have sweeping protection 
from judicial review.  That in turn could lead to either of two 
divergent scenarios.  In one, golf course owners—bowing to the 
municipalities’ solid legal authority—would negotiate with towns to 
find mutually acceptable alternatives to unprofitable uses.  Or, 
municipalities may get carried away, act sloppily or “irrationally” 
and provoke developers to press regulatory takings claims.  Courts 
would be in the unenviable position of discerning when the cities 
have, in the takings parlance, “gone too far.” 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mendota Golf could have been the beginning of the end for 
regional planning in the Twin Cities, not to mention a couple of 
golf courses in Dakota County.  Upholding the mandamus order 
against the city would have let the tail (zoning) wag the dog 
(planning).  The modest225 progress toward comprehensive 
planning and regionalism could have begun to unravel.  Instead, 
the supreme court reaffirmed that cities can work within the 
regional scheme and craft a vision of their future without fear of 
legal attack by developers.  Upholding the legislature’s 
commitment to regional planning provides stability to 
municipalities and developers alike. 
Mendota Golf was not a case where a city ran roughshod over a 
developer’s rights.  For those occasions, Minnesota still needs a law 
that keeps cities from crossing the line from planning to regulatory 
taking.  Presented with an opportunity to settle precisely where that 
line is, Mendota Golf instead deferred the question.  The people of 
Mendota Heights get to decide that their city will stay green. 226  But 
this developer and others could soon return for another swing. 
 
 
 225. Poradek, supra note 70, at 1363. 
 226. As the time of publication, Mendota Heights took the first steps toward 
buying the Par 3 course from Mendota Golf, approving a general letter of intent to 
preserve the course.  Frederick Melo, Voters Will Decide Whether City Should Buy Golf 
Course, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Jan. 19, 2006, at B1.  Voters were to be 
asked to approve the land’s purchase for $2.79 million in a referendum.  Id.  A 
rejection of the deal, the city’s mayor said, “would mean allowing the current 
owners . . . to sell the 17-acre site to a housing developer, or develop it 
themselves.”  Id. 
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